Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior by Matovski, Aleksandar
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2020
Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior
Matovski, Aleksandar
Routledge
Aleksandar Matovski (2020) Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior,
Security Studies, 29:5, 964-990
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67367
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Strategic Intelligence and International Crisis Behavior
Aleksandar Matovski
ABSTRACT
High-quality strategic intelligence is commonly considered to be
a stabilizing factor in international relations, steadying decision
making and preventing misunderstandings and surprise attacks.
This paper challenges this view by arguing that deep intelli-
gence penetrations are some of the most destabilizing forces in
high-stakes security crises. By exposing the opponents’ weak-
nesses and avenues of attack, intelligence penetration not only
provides its beneficiaries with a potentially decisive offensive
capability but also compels them to use it quickly, before the
breach is discovered and the advantage is gone. Also, as the
intelligence target is generally unaware of this capability, it does
not serve as a deterrent that might force the target to the bar-
gaining table. Thus, paradoxically, opposing sides are more likely
to find a peaceful solution to crises when they do not have
extensive strategic intelligence on each other.
Intelligence has played a key role in the relations between political com-
munities since the writings of Sun Tzu and the Old Testament. In the past
century, cases such as the breaking of the German Enigma code in World
War II or the discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba precipitated trans-
formative events in international affairs. At the same time, the most devas-
tating defeats—on the order of Pearl Harbor, the Yom Kippur War, and
9/11—have repeatedly been described as “intelligence failures.” Today, with
the “war on terrorism,” “cyber,” and “hybrid” warfare, and the reemergence
of major-power rivalries forming the backdrop of international relations,
there is a widespread understanding that intelligence is more important to
the conduct of world politics than in any other period in history.
Yet, despite its apparent importance, the impact of intelligence on inter-
state behavior remains a relatively underdeveloped area in the study of
international relations. Part of the reason for this lies in the secrecy that
shrouds the inner workings of intelligence and its impact on decision mak-
ing from the prying eye of systematic scholarly inquiry. But a more funda-
mental obstacle, as I argue in this article, is conceptual. Our current
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understanding of intelligence is still largely a product of the traumatic fail-
ures to warn against the devastating surprise attacks of World War II and
beyond, and the obsession to preclude their recurrence in the future. The
impulse to study intelligence from the perspective of its most apparent
(and shocking) manifestation—the failure to alert against sneak attacks—
has made analysts prone to approach it as a mainly defensive instrument.1
This view has come at the expense of the equally plausible logic that “good
intelligence’s ability to help the aggressor … should be as important as its
potential for warning the defender against surprise.”2 This creates a systematic
bias in the study of intelligence.3 To date, there are no comprehensive
accounts of the role of the meticulous Japanese intelligence on the US fleet
dispositions in the Pearl Harbor attack4 to match Roberta Wohlstetter’s5 sem-
inal study on the failure of American intelligence warning. Similarly, there are
no equivalents to the in-depth studies of the Israeli intelligence failure in the
1973 Arab-Israeli War6 to account for the critical role of Egyptian intelligence
in the planning and implementation of the surprise attack.7
This conceptual bias in intelligence research is the main motive for this
article. I claim that the typically overlooked role of intelligence as a force
multiplier in the offensive application of national power has had a progres-
sively more consequential—and destabilizing—impact on international rela-
tions than the use of intelligence for defensive purposes. By allowing even
much weaker contestants in international disputes to identify their oppo-
nents’ vulnerabilities and pool resources to deliver crushing blows, major
intelligence successes have a unique capacity to escalate conflicts and to
short-circuit the pursuit of diplomatic solutions. In particular, this sort of
offensive-enabling intelligence provides a very attractive first-strike strategic
alternative for many contestants who cannot afford prolonged militarized
standoffs or attrition warfare—as well as for aggressive states seeking to
upend the balance of power. Furthermore, I show that participants in inter-
national disputes that possess the critical intelligence to carry out a
1Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 341–42;
Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 6, 73.
2Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 150.
3Woodrow J. Kuhns, “Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology,” in Paradoxes of
Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, ed. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 80–100.
4Louis Allen, “Japanese Intelligence Systems,” Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 4 (October 1987): 547–62.
5Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
6Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
2012); Aryeh Shaleṿ, Israel’s Intelligence Assessment before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and
Distraction (Sussex, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2010); Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: The Inside Story of
the Yom Kippur War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018); Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes:
The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).
7Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
2004), 99–104; Yigal Sheffy, “Overcoming Strategic Weakness: The Egyptian Deception and the Yom Kippur
War,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (2006): 809–28.
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crippling surprise attack would not only be drawn to this alternative over a
negotiated solution but would also be under immense pressure to commit
to it quickly before it is discovered and the advantage is gone. At the same
time, the target of the surprise attack sees no additional incentive to com-
promise because it is unaware of the danger. Continuing its brinkmanship
instead of backing off, the target inadvertently puts additional pressure on
the intelligence beneficiary to launch its surprise attack.
The paper tests these propositions by process tracing the impact of intelli-
gence on decision making in the lead up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict
and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. These crises provide particular analytic
leverage on this topic for at least three reasons. First, these are the two most
widely studied interstate confrontations, offering an unparalleled wealth of
declassified data, materials, and analysis. This allows for a very fine-grained
study of the role of intelligence on crisis decision-making processes, which
cannot yet be matched by other cases. Second, these two crises cover the full
variation of the variables of interest. Whereas the 1967 conflict occurred
against the backdrop of an unprecedented Israeli intelligence penetration of
the Arab militaries and escalated into an Israeli surprise attack, US intelli-
gence in 1962 was fairly limited, and the Cuban missile crisis resulted in a
negotiated solution. Thus, a paired, in-depth comparison of how these two
crises unfolded provides a distinctive opportunity to establish if there is a
link between intelligence and the escalation of international conflicts. Finally,
the lessons of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Cuban missile crisis may
have, paradoxically, become even more relevant today. Since the 1960s, the
ability to gather intelligence and to translate it into paralyzing surprise
attacks has grown exponentially, spurred by the advent of new communica-
tion technologies, precision-guided munitions, stealth, and other advances.
Thus, to the extent that it exists, the link between intelligence penetration
and the escalation of international conflicts may have grown closer than
ever before.
With these goals in mind, the article proceeds in three parts. The next
section reviews the current biases about the role of intelligence in inter-
national crises and proposes a new crisis-bargaining framework, which
incorporates the effects of intelligence as a multiplier of offensive military
capabilities. The third section of this paper tests this theory empirically on
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the Cuban missile crisis. The final section
summarizes the paper’s findings and its broader implications.
Intelligence and International Conflict
The question of whether intelligence favors offense or defense has been
decisively influenced by the traumas from the warning failures of World
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War II and the fear of nuclear surprise in the Cold War. At one extreme of
this argument, David Kahn has argued that as attackers use surprise, and
intelligence is the obvious counter, it follows that intelligence is an inherently
defensive instrument. According to Kahn: “Offense and defense enjoin differ-
ent attitudes toward intelligence. It exists of course in both. But it is essential
… only in the defense … an army can await a blow only if it believes that
a blow is planned, and such a belief can be created only by information
about the enemy.”8 Kahn claims that this principle is confirmed by the fact
that “nations that are aggressive tend to neglect intelligence, while nations in
a defensive posture emphasize and rely on it.”9 In his analysis of German
intelligence in World War II, Kahn concludes that “balance-of-power policy,
which is a reactive, or defensive technique requires intelligence to succeed
… Britain was a sea power, essentially defensive … she needed intelligence.
Germany was a continental power … Her armies, attacking, did not require
intelligence. And so she failed to develop it.”10
The literature on international crisis bargaining has also viewed intelli-
gence as a primarily defensive, stabilizing force in interstate relations. In one
of the most influential works in this area, James D. Fearon11 suggests states’
secret information about their respective military capabilities and resolve—
and the incentives to misrepresent these—could prevent them from locating
negotiated settlements that are mutually preferable to conflict.12 Because war
is a costly enterprise, with at least some uncertainty about its outcome,
rational, risk-averse states would almost always have a range of bargains on
how to divide the issue at stake that would be preferable to the “costly
lottery” of war. To make these bargains, however, states must know each
other’s “utilities” for going to war: the probability of victory based on their
respective military capabilities and their individual costs of going to war. In
all likelihood, each state would have information about its own, but not
about the other side’s, utility for war. They would also have incentives to
misrepresent their respective utilities to get a better deal. The conflict could
therefore ensue due to the inability to pinpoint each other’s preferences and
the range of negotiated settlements that both sides would prefer to war.
Intelligence could solve this problem by penetrating the opponents’
“private information” and providing objective insights about their capabil-
ities and expectations. This knowledge of the enemy gleaned through
8David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 1978), 5.
9David Kahn, “An Historical Theory of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (2001): 79–92.
10Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 513.
11James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer
1995): 387–88.
12Although Fearon formalized the idea that disagreements about relative power could lead to war, Geoffrey
Blainey first introduced it (see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988)). For a
broader review of the crisis-bargaining literature, see Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International
Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (June 2002): 1–30.
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espionage, could—as expected by the defensive theory of intelligence—con-
sequently lead to a more complete and sensible calculation of the strategic
situation and increase the chances of a negotiated solution to the crisis.
But is this always the case? As Fearon acknowledges in his analysis, states
would still jealously guard secrets about their military dispositions and capa-
bilities, despite the fact that they could avoid war by sharing this informa-
tion.13 The main reason for this is the parties to the conflict have nothing to
gain from revealing their military capacity: as they have incentives to exagger-
ate it, their opponents would have no reasons to believe them. But there is
another crucial reason for secrecy, which has received far less attention in
existing accounts: the same intelligence that could identify mutually acceptable
settlements by revealing the opponents’ capabilities could just as easily be
used to pinpoint their weaknesses, making war advantageous for its benefi-
ciary. Commenting on the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Fearon admits that a
“far superior intelligence service had provided the Japanese military with a
clear picture of the Russian strengths and weaknesses in Northeast Asia and
enabled them to develop an effective offensive strategy.”14 The Japanese
would have been foolish to disclose this knowledge of Russian military secrets
and the advantages they gained by it, as “explaining how they planned to win
the war might seriously compromise any such attempt.”15 Thus, the Japanese
informational advantage—and the incentive to preserve it—created a disagree-
ment about relative power that ultimately resulted in war.
As an instrument of state power, intelligence, therefore, imposes the
same dilemmas as weapons systems and military postures that cannot be
classified as either defensive or offensive. By providing insight into enemy
plans and capabilities, intelligence may allow states to bolster their defenses
and reach negotiated solutions more effectively. At the same time, the col-
lection of intelligence for defensive purposes also creates offensive opportu-
nities. Consider its potential effects on one of the core pillars of nuclear
deterrence: the ballistic missile submarine.16 Intelligence about the hidden
locations of the rival nuclear power’s ballistic missile submarines deployed
on deterrence patrol is the essential prerequisite for their elimination by
antisubmarine or nuclear forces in a potential conflict. To somehow deter-
mine their whereabouts through reconnaissance, or some other form of
intelligence collection is to make the defensive objective of protecting one’s
own territory from the opponent’s nuclear second strike—the primary pur-
pose of the ballistic missile submarine—possible. But, equally, this would
enable the removal of the opponent’s deterrent, allowing the beneficiary of
13Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 393.
14Ibid., 399.
15Ibid., 400.
16Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 207.
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the intelligence penetration to strike first without fear of retaliation. Hence,
by virtue of its ability to target the enemy deterrent, intelligence itself
becomes the enabling component of a first-strike capability.17
This capacity to threaten the opponent’s retaliatory capacities has been com-
ing within reach of contemporary militaries with breakneck speed. Over the
past several decades, the overwhelming emphasis in military advances has been
on weapons, platforms, and tactics that can deliver swift, stealthy, precise, and
crippling blows to an adversary, taking away the ability to respond in time and
to retaliate in any meaningful fashion. By the early 2000s, the vast majority of
weapons the United States dispensed even in low-intensity conflicts were preci-
sion-guided munitions.18 Similarly, by 2019, 17% of the US Air Force consisted
of stealth aircraft; by 2030, this proportion could reach almost 70% and would
be mirrored by other advanced militaries.19
One of the potentially most consequential developments in this area is the
hypersonic missile, which should be precise and fast enough to hit a moving tar-
get the size of a truck anywhere in the world in a matter of minutes after
launch. As their depressed flight trajectory makes hypersonic missiles much
more difficult to detect and counter, and capable of striking targets much faster,
they would be ideal for destroying the enemy’s retaliation capabilities or for
“decapitation” attacks—assassinating opponent’s leadership—in a first strike.20
Such weapons are already being deployed or are close to deployment in the
Russian, Chinese, and US militaries21—a development that threatens to decisively
tilt the already precarious strategic offense–defense balance22 in favor of offense.
Even before the advent of these new weapons and capabilities, both crit-
ics and proponents of the doctrine of strategic bombardment and standoff
engagements have agreed that the modern militaries possess more than
adequate standoff precision munitions to deliver the first strike with crip-
pling effects.23 The crucial challenge has been to devise technical means to
furnish this capability with adequate targeting intelligence. For this reason,
17The largely underappreciated ability to track and target the supposedly stealthy submarines and mobile
missile launchers during the Cold War (particularly by the United States) was a key reason why the
introduction of nuclear weapons never led to stable deterrence, or the avoidance of dangerous arms races and
crises. See Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence,
Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 38–73. Also see Keir A.
Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear
Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9–49.
18Barry D. Watts, The Evolution of Precision Strike (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2013).
19Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, Jacob Cohn, Timothy A. Walton, and Lukas Autenried, An Air Force for an Era of
Great Power Competition (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019).
20R. Jeffrey Smith, “Hypersonic Missiles Are Unstoppable. And They’re Starting a New Global Arms Race,” New
York Times Magazine, 19 June 2019.
21Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger. “Russia Deploys Hypersonic Weapon, Potentially Renewing Arms Race,”
New York Times, 27 December 2019.
22Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce.”
23Robert A. Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” Security Studies 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/1998):
93–114; Barry D Watts, “Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies,” Security Studies
7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/1998): 115–71.
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the quintessential goal of military modernization over the past few decades
has been to close the gap between offensive standoff capabilities and the
intelligence needed to successfully deploy them to secure rapid,
decisive victories.
Recent developments in this area, therefore, represent a culmination of a
trend. Since at least the Second World War, the precise knowledge of the
enemy’s dispositions and vulnerabilities was the key ingredient that made
the deep-penetration, Blitzkrieg-style offensives possible. The historical
record clearly shows that such detailed intelligence on the opponent’s stra-
tegic weaknesses is a key enabler of surprise attacks.24 The audacious Fall
Gelb, the German plan for the invasion of France 1940, as well as the initial
stages of Operation Barbarossa against the USSR, for instance, had been
designed and executed on the basis of deep knowledge of French and
Soviet doctrine, command structures, and frontline orders of battle.25 The
commanders of the Pearl Harbor strike were unequivocal that their attack
would have failed without the detailed intelligence on the US fleet and
installations in Hawaii.26 Similarly, the Egyptian surprise in the 1973
October War relied on the superb intelligence about Israeli defenses along
the Suez Canal, as well as on the Israeli military and its doctrine.27 These
disastrous conflicts took place not just because the victims of the surprise
attack knew too little about their enemies’ plans and capabilities but also
because the attackers knew too much.
To illustrate the offense/defense conundrum created by intelligence pene-
tration, I develop a modified version of the canonical crisis-bargaining
model, which I fully outline in the online appendix to this paper. Its basic
intuition is simple. In Fearon’s original model, where none of the sides to
an international dispute can deliver a crippling first strike, there is always a
range of bargained solutions that the opponents prefer to fighting. As
result, the equilibrium outcome tends to be a peaceful, negotiated solution.
This changes dramatically in a scenario where intelligence penetration ena-
bles one side to stage a surprise attack. First, the surprise attack option
boosts its beneficiary’s odds of victory in an armed confrontation, dramat-
ically reducing the range of bargained solutions it would prefer to fighting.
Second, because the potential victims of the intelligence-enabled surprise
24Klaus E. Knorr and Patrick M. Morgan, Strategic Military Surprise: Initiatives and Opportunities (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 1984), 196.
25Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000); Amnon Sella,
“‘Barbarossa’ Surprise Attack and Communication,” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 3 (July
1978): 555–83.
26Allen, “Japanese Intelligence Systems”; Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, eds., The Pearl Harbor
Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1999). Despite the accurate picture of US fleet
dispositions in Hawaii, it should be noted that the Japanese attack was also blunted by the limitations of the
available intelligence, specifically about the fact that US carriers were away from port. This again highlights
the centrality of detailed intelligence in the ability to deliver crippling first strikes.
27Pollack, Arabs at War, 99–101.
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attack are, by definition, unaware of the threat, they are unable to account
for it in their diplomatic strategy. As a result, they attempt to drive a much
harder bargain than what the first-strike capable side is willing to accept
given its clandestine offensive advantage. Finally, as the surprise attack cap-
ability could be quickly lost due to enemy redeployments and counterintel-
ligence efforts, the potential beneficiaries are under immense time pressure
to take advantage of it. Pushed by the “use it or lose it” logic of the intelli-
gence-enabled surprise attack option, they are far more likely to turn away
from deterrent strategies and time-consuming diplomacy and opt in favor
of a violent solution to the dispute.
This framework paints a very different picture from the classical under-
standings of the role of intelligence in international crises. In particular, it
suggests that surprise attacks should not be exclusively seen as a product of
intelligence failures, that is, of knowing too little about one’s adversary.
Instead, such catastrophic outcomes are at least as likely to result from
intelligence success: knowing so much as to be able to deliver knockout
blows. The critical test—and the key independent variable in this paper’s
theoretic framework—is whether the intelligence penetration is extensive
enough to translate into an offensive force employment strategy that holds
a reasonable chance of carrying out a debilitating surprise attack. The
second precondition is that the attacker’s preparations remain secret, or
else the surprise attack would be thwarted by the target. If both conditions
are met, intelligence reduces its proprietor’s “reservation values for attack”
and hence the overall scope for bargaining in three ways: (1) by multiply-
ing the attacker’s probability of victory; (2) by decreasing the attacker’s
costs of war; and (3) reducing the attacker’s incentive to pursue a negoti-
ated settlement. The final reason arises because the (presumably significant)
shift in the balance of power in favor of the intelligence beneficiary does
not change the potential bargaining range of this crisis for his or her
opponent. Oblivious of the looming sneak attack, the victim operates in the
old bargaining range, unaware she or he would be better off making add-
itional concessions to avoid the much costlier outcome of strategic surprise.
Based on this presence or absence of extensive intelligence (the independent
variable), we can therefore specify two causal pathways about the impact of
intelligence on decision making in international crises. The first proceeds along
the following logical chain:
A1. The availability of extensive, high-grade intelligence about enemy dispo-
sitions and vulnerabilities decisively biases its beneficiaries toward first-
strike strategies, provided they have adequate military forces to exploit
the intelligence insights (offensive bias thesis);
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A2. The presence of a first-strike strategy that relies on intelligence stifles its
proprietors’ use of alternative, deterrent military strategies for fear of
provoking the enemy to redeploy or assume a more alert posture,
thwarting the potential surprise attack (deterrence avoidance thesis);
A3. As the crisis escalates, the increased risk of discovering and neutralizing
the intelligence penetration, as well as of possible redeployment and
increased alertness of enemy forces, threaten to diminish the informational
advantage and the likelihood of achieving surprise, increasing the pressure
to launch a first strike before the opportunity is lost (time pressure thesis);
A4. As the targets are unaware of the vulnerability created by the intelli-
gence penetration, they also contribute to the failure of bargaining;
oblivious to the danger, the potential victim remains intransigent in
pursuing its original bargain, leaving the prospective attacker few incen-
tives for not pressing the first-strike advantage (short-circuiting bar-
gaining thesis).
The alternative, low-intelligence scenario of crisis decision making fol-
lows the opposite logic:
B1. Lacking extensive intelligence on the enemy force dispositions and vul-
nerabilities, a potential attacker could not devise a first-strike strategy
that holds a reasonable ex ante promise of delivering a crippling blow;
B2. Without such intimate knowledge of the enemy, the first-strike strategy
becomes equivalent to the “risky gamble” of war in the original bargain-
ing model, and the participants in the crisis favor the alternative strat-
egies of deterrence and negotiation;
B3. As neither of the involved parties enjoys a fleeting informational advan-
tage that could be transformed into a crippling surprise attack, the pres-
sures to act precipitously and strike without warning are much lower,
creating possibilities for better considered and more graduated
responses, and bargaining;
B4. As they do not have to worry about alerting their opponents, or provok-
ing redeployment of their forces for fear of losing their information and
first-strike advantage, the parties to the dispute are less constrained to
pursue deterrence strategies and engage in signaling that would facilitate
a peaceful settlement.
To empirically test the validity of these hypotheses, I examine the impact
of intelligence on decision making in two major interstate crises: the April/
May 1967 crisis between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and the 1962
Cuban missile crisis.
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Intelligence and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War erupted through a steady escalation of political
hostilities and violent incidents between Israel and its Arab neighbors in
the years after the 1956 Suez crisis. The 1956 armistice had forced Israel to
abandon its territorial gains in the Sinai Peninsula, provided a United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to keep this strategic penin-
sula demilitarized. Yet the armistice failed to address any of the underlying
tensions. Spurred by rising nationalism, anti-Israeli sentiments, and their
growing alignment with the Soviet bloc, Arab states rapidly modernized
their militaries and began supporting Palestinian guerilla and terrorist raids
against Israel.28 The result was a series of escalating Israeli retaliations that
provided the pretext for Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser to remilitarize the
Sinai and evict the UN peacekeepers in May 1967. Nasser aimed to force
Israel to back down from its confrontation with Syria and win a bloodless
political victory that would showcase him as the preeminent Arab leader.
However, Egypt’s remilitarization of the Sinai also posed a harsh security
dilemma for the Israeli leadership. Although desperate to avoid war, the
Israeli government feared that if they tolerated this situation, Israel’s future
survival in its hostile environment would be threatened. After days of
excruciating and acrimonious debate, the Israeli cabinet finally decided on
4 June 1967 to resolve the crisis by launching a surprise attack against the
Arab militaries the next day.29
Two questions are therefore critical for understanding the onset of the
1967 war: (1) Why did the Israeli leadership fail to pursue diplomatic and/
or deterrent strategies that might have averted the war?; and (2) What
ultimately led them to believe that the first-strike strategy was their best
option? The ultimate authority to make decisions on peace or war in 1967
resided in the hands of the Israeli cabinet, under the cautious leadership of
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. Both the prime minister and most of his cab-
inet were extremely reluctant to initiate a war. Many of them doubted
Israel’s ability to win a multifront engagement with the Arab neighbors
and survive the possible Soviet intervention they feared would follow.30
Prime Minister Eshkol in particular feared an Israeli first strike would also
ruin efforts to establish the much-coveted strategic alliance with the United
States and would leave the country precariously isolated.31 The General
Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), on the other hand, initially
28Mordechai Bar-On, ed., Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military History (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006),
134; Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 27–32.
29Bar-On, Never-Ending Conflict, 135; Oren, Six Days of War, 87.
30Bar-On, Never-Ending Conflict, 137.
31Tom Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2005), 114–15, 292.
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discounted the threat of Arab invasion and thus the need for a forceful
reaction; it later changed its mind and weighed in heavily in favor of a first
strike.32 The factors that shaped these conflicting assessments led to one of
the most controversial decision-making processes in Israeli history.
The analysis that follows attempts to isolate the effect of intelligence on
Israeli strategic decisions in the 1967 crisis up to the point when the coun-
try launched military operations. According to this paper’s theory, substan-
tive intelligence on their enemies’ vulnerabilities should have strongly
predisposed Israeli war planning toward an offensive first strike, designed
to deliver a crippling blow against the Arab armies. In addition, the pres-
ence of this option should have narrowed the range of alternative resolu-
tions to the crisis that the Israeli leadership would be willing to pursue.
These hypotheses are evaluated below.
A1: Intelligence and the Israeli Military Options
One way to analyze the effect of intelligence on the adoption of first-strike
military strategies is through counterfactual analysis. In the context of the
1967 crisis, this means asking whether the Israeli military and civilian lead-
erships could have had the same level of confidence in the first-strike
option without their superb intelligence on the Arab armies. In other
words, if the Israelis only had access to more general knowledge about their
enemies’ dispositions and vulnerabilities, would the first-strike strategy still
have seemed a feasible alternative?
The general military knowledge that typically serves as the benchmark
for evaluating the merits of launching a war is the military balance of the
opposing armies. In the 1967 crisis, it heavily favored the Arab nations.
Israel’s main foe, Egypt, fielded 240,000 troops and 1,180 tanks, compared
to Israel’s 264,000 combat troops and 800 tanks. And unlike the Egyptian
military, which concentrated its forces against Israel on the Sinai, the IDF
had to fight on two more fronts. There, they faced the additional 163,000
troops, 820 tanks, 750 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 1,400 artil-
lery pieces of the combined Syrian and Jordanian militaries. In the air, the
numerical balance was even less favorable. The Israeli Air force (IAF)
fielded 207 combat aircraft to Egypt’s 450, plus the combined strength of
160 combat aircraft of the Syrian and Jordanian air forces. Overall, on all
three fronts, the IDF was outnumbered 1.5:1 in combat troops, about 2.5:1
in tanks, and 3:1 in combat aircraft.33
The Arab armies also boasted an edge in the technical capabilities of
their militaries. Enjoying unfettered access to cutting-edge Soviet weaponry,
32Edgar O’Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972), chaps. 5–9.
33O’Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War; Pollack, Arabs at War.
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the combined Egyptian and Syrian air forces fielded 236 MIG-21s—the
USSR’s newest fighter—whose technical characteristics could only be
matched by the 72 Mirage fighters in the IAF arsenal. On the ground, the
Soviet T-54/55 model tanks, considered an even tradeoff with Israel’s most
advanced Centurion tanks (of which Israel had only 250), formed the
majority of Egypt’s and Syria’s armored forces. Additionally, the cutting-
edge Soviet-manufactured APCs, artillery, antitank weapons, and communi-
cation gear at the Arab forces’ disposal outclassed the “largely obsolete
equipment Israel has scrounged from the West.”34
Clearly, relying on this general knowledge of the military balance alone,
it is hard to conclude that Israel would have been advantaged in launching
the first strike, especially as an all-out Arab attack assault on the Jewish
state was not considered imminent throughout virtually the entire crisis.35
However, these orthodox measures of numerical preponderance and
technological superiority alone make poor predictors of offensive advan-
tage. Instead, what matters for carrying out a successful offensive operation
is how the combatants deploy their forces—their proficiency in combining
fire, maneuver, concealment, and independent unit action—in relation to
their opponents’ forces, taking advantage of their strengths and weaknesses,
and anticipating their responses.36 From this perspective, the capacity of
the IDF to execute the first strike in 1967 critically depended on its ability
to learn the details of its enemies’ forces and their employment.
Did the quality of Israeli intelligence allow for this? Thanks to years of
aggressive and strikingly successful pursuit of Arab secrets that had direct
application to the battlefield, Israel was able to achieve one of the most
extensive intelligence penetrations on record. According to Samuel M.
Katz, “It is safe to assume that in no time in the history of modern warfare
has a nation been equipped with such an intimate portrait of the enemy’s
disposition, deployment and abilities as was the IDF at 0740 on the morn-
ing of June 5, 1967 [the time of the Israeli strike].”37
This intelligence picture has made Arab vulnerabilities so apparent that
it completely fixated the IDF strategic thinking on taking advantage of
them. The idea for a massive surprise air strike to knock out the Egyptian
Air Force, which dominated IDF plans and drove Israeli cabinet debates
throughout the crisis, was a product of the spectacular intelligence penetra-
tion of Egypt’s military. According to Gordon Thomas, “In the run-up to
the Six Day War in 1967, there was either a Mossad katsa [case officer] or
34Pollack, Arabs at War, 59.
35Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 266, 296–301, 325–37.
36Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2004), chaps. 2–3.
37Samuel M. Katz, Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 189; Stewart Steven,
The Spymasters of Israel (New York: MacMillan, 1980), 191.
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an informer inside every Egyptian air base and military headquarters.”38
Through this network, Israeli intelligence learned that the Egyptian Air
Force was extremely vulnerable to a surprise air strike in the period
between 07:30 and 08:00. At this time, technicians manning air defenses
were most fatigued from their eight-hour night shift; Egyptian fighter inter-
ceptor patrols along the Sinai front stood down completely, with the planes
returning to base, and the pilots and ground control teams going to break-
fast.39 In the same period, combat aircraft that had been inside their hang-
ars overnight were moved outside, to their unsheltered stands, for preflight
maintenance. Crucially, Israeli intelligence knew that between 07:00 and
08:00, most Egyptian air force senior officers would be stuck in Cairo’s
notorious traffic jams on the way to their offices, and hence be out of
touch with their units. This virtually ensured a major paralysis in the event
of an Israeli attack, as the unwillingness of subordinates to take action
without direction from senior commanders was pervasive in the
Egyptian military.40
Furthermore, intimate knowledge of the Egyptian radar and air defense
coverage and routines enabled the Israelis to find blind spots that would
allow an airstrike to approach its targets undetected. Based on this intelli-
gence, the IAF planners devised the surprise attack plan, which foresaw the
Israeli airstrike groups flying low over the Mediterranean and then turning
to attack the Egyptian air bases from the rear: striking from the north to
south and west to east instead of the direct east-west avenue of approach
across the Sinai front. For the bombing runs, Israeli intelligence provided
remarkably detailed, up-to-date target sheets, which not only accurately
portrayed the position of planes, runways, key buildings, and antiaircraft
weapons, but also the locations of decoy aircraft that Egyptians deployed to
confuse potential attackers.41
Similar intelligence scoops against Arab ground forces provided the
foundation for Israeli offensives on the Sinai, Golan Heights, and West
Bank fronts. Through a combination of human informants, signals intelli-
gence, and air reconnaissance, the Israeli command learned that Egyptian
forces in the Sinai had deployed their defenses to counter an IDF thrust
through the same avenues as in the 1956 war. They had also left certain
sectors of the desert undefended, as they believed these not traversable by
armor. Thus, the Israeli ground plan focused on an offensive along the axis
of advance opposite to that of 1956, through the undefended gaps in the
38Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad, 7th ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 2007), 55–56.
39Due to their concentration in their barracks and the officer’s messes, the IAF strike later killed 100 of Egypt’s
350 pilots. Pollack, Arabs at War, 63.
40Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (New York: Grove Press,
1991), 224; Steven, The Spymasters of Israel, 190–91; Pollack, Arabs at War, 63.
41Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 224–25.
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Egyptian order of battle and striking their exposed flanks.42 On the West
Bank and Golan Heights fronts, Jordanian and Syrian forces had adopted
defensive force disposition strategies that relied heavily on the use of
obstacles and fortifications to halt the Israeli advance. But the remarkable
Israeli intelligence penetration at the highest echelons of the Syrian and
Jordanian militaries allowed the IDF to pinpoint opportunities for offensive
action on these fronts as well. By unearthing the disposition of Syrian forti-
fications, defensive plans, training, and tactical doctrine, Israeli intelligence
became the midwife of IDF’s daring plan for the offensive takeover of the
Golan Heights.43
The sheer magnitude of the Israeli insight into the Arab armies not only
highlighted the possibilities for an IDF blitzkrieg but also instilled an
unswerving conviction among Israel’s military leadership that this was the
only way to successfully resolve the crisis. For the Israeli military, the
opportunity to neutralize their enemies with one mortal blow seemed too
close within their reach to let it slip. In General Ariel Sharon’s assessment,
shared unanimously by the entire General Staff, the crisis offered “a historic
opportunity” that would enable the IDF to destroy the Arab militaries.44
As the crisis progressed, Israeli decision making was completely over-
taken by the tug-of-war between the General Staff, obsessed with securing
approval to implement their first-strike plan, and the reluctant civilian lead-
ership. The extraordinary insights that Israeli intelligence had into the Arab
adversaries played the central role in the outcome of this debate. At the
key cabinet meetings during the crisis, Aharon Yariv, head of IDF
Intelligence Branch, revealed the extent of his service’s penetration of the
Arab militaries and assured the ministers of the success of the first-
strike plan.45
The final decision to go to war was made on 4 June when Meir Amit,
chief of Mossad, presented the findings from his mission in the United
States. To the bitterly divided cabinet, Amit conveyed that the United
States would not intervene on Israel’s behalf, and that US intelligence
shared the assessment that Israel would prevail in a preemptive strike.46
Amit’s intelligence evaluations were the final straw that broke the resistance
to the first-strike option. Torn between the uncertainty of diplomacy and
the promise of the preemptive strike, the Israeli Cabinet opted for
the latter.47
42Pollack, Arabs at War, 62; Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 232–33.
43Pollack, Arabs at War, 462; Steven, The Spymasters of Israel, 192–93.
44Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 255.
45Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 217–18.
46Ibid., 222.
47Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 333–34; Steven, The Spymasters of Israel, 196.
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A2 and A3: Intelligence and Surprise Attack—Stifling the Alternatives
From the moment the UN peacekeeping force was removed from the Sinai
on 19 May, thereby eliminating the last hurdle for a direct military con-
frontation between Israel and Egypt, the Israeli leadership became fixated
on the preemptive strike option and systematically failed to attempt alter-
native policies that might have avoided full-scale war. Right after Egypt
asked the UN to leave, both the UN Secretary General and US diplomats
tried to convince Israel to accept a transfer of the UN forces on its terri-
tory, from which they could still maintain the buffer zone. But they were
flatly rejected as the Israeli military insisted that the presence of UN forces
would limit Israel’s ability to carry out a surprise offensive against Egypt.48
A few days later, when Egypt closed the Tiran Straits on 23 May, the same
situation was repeated. The army completely ignored the option to take
limited military action to open the traits and deter further Egyptian provo-
cations, insisting instead on the necessity to implement the full-scale pre-
emptive strike plan.49
On multiple occasions, various diplomats, as well as the “doves” in the
Israeli cabinet, proposed that the preemptive strike should be postponed
for a few weeks to create an opportunity for a diplomatic solution to the
crisis. The United States, for instance, proposed a settlement under which
Israeli ships would not sail through the Gulf of Aqaba under its flag in this
cooling-off period, and Egypt would not hinder the passage of unidentified
ships. Failing that, some maintained that it would be sufficient for Israel to
break the Egyptian naval blockade rather than start a full-scale war. The
army consistently rebuked these policies as dangerous and self-defeating,
for they would jeopardize the IDF’s ability to preserve the element of sur-
prise on which victory depended. Losing his temper, the Chief of the IDF
General Staff Yitzhak Rabin put it quite explicitly at one point: “There’s no
guarantee that in two weeks we’ll be able to screw the Egyptians.”50
The case for diplomacy aimed toward providing possibilities to de-escal-
ate the crisis and allowing Israel to reinforce its position simply could not
compete with the prospect of completely overturning the Middle Eastern
military balance with one swift surprise attack. According to Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan: “If we take a hundred of their [Egyptian] planes
out of commission, that’s worth more than any additional arms that …
[Israel] can get hold of in six months.” General Sharon maintained that the
destruction of the Egyptian army would prevent it from attacking Israel for
at least ten years after the conflict.51
48Steven, The Spymasters of Israel, 227.
49Ibid., 234, 239.
50Ibid., 235–39, 274, 289–90, 308.
51Ibid., 324, 336.
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This line of reasoning also suppressed the implementation of other more
limited deterrence options. In particular, Shimon Peres, then a member of
the opposition in the Knesset, proposed that Israel should conduct a
“nuclear test, a demonstration that would have restored Israel’s deterrence
with certainty and prevented war from breaking out.”52 Although discus-
sions of Israeli nuclear options during the 1967 crisis still remain classified,
the proposal of Peres appears to have been flatly rejected.53 Several pro-
posals for Israeli ships to be sent through the Gulf of Aqaba, so that the
Egyptians could attack them and thus give Israel a legitimate cause for
military action, were similarly rejected. The army’s response was that such
actions would only alert the Egyptians that war is imminent, and thus IDF
would lose the vital element of surprise.54
The desire to turn Israel’s tremendous but fleeting informational advan-
tage into a crushing surprise attack was also the main source of pressure
on the government to approve the first-strike plan. Again, Israel’s remark-
able intelligence insights into the Arab vulnerabilities were the main argu-
ments that propelled this debate. Before practically every cabinet meeting,
IDF Intelligence Chief Yariv delivered elaborate intelligence briefings where
he constantly emphasized the urgency of approving the execution of the
preemptive attack plan. During the critical 2 June cabinet meeting, he
revealed that because of the rush to deploy as many forces as possible to
the Sinai, many of the Egyptian Army units were still not properly
equipped and that swift Israeli action would be able to catch them unpre-
pared. General Mordechai Hod, commander of the Israeli Air Force, added
that his forces knew exactly where each of their opponents’ combat aircraft
was located—an insight that could be lost with redeployments. “Every day
that passes substantially lessens the chances of Israel attaining air superi-
ority,” Yariv complained. IDF Chief of Staff Rabin and sixteen other gener-
als present at the meeting fervently insisted the cabinet approve the
preemptive strikes immediately, lest they lose the advantage.55
The army’s final push to convince the cabinet to approve the first-strike
plan came 2 days later, on 4 June, when Yariv presented new intelligence
that confirmed Egypt just redeployed two commando battalions to Jordan.
To the IDF General Staff, this was an unequivocal signal of the imminent
onset of cross-border sabotage attacks, presumably aimed to take the city
of Eilat, Israel’s strategic port on the Red Sea. Defense Minister Dayan and
General Rabin concluded that at that point, waiting would cost Israel its
victory. If Israel acted immediately, Rabin promised an easy war: “Within




55Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 220–22; Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 324.
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two or three hours we’ll have a huge aerial achievement, and within the
first day … other forces will make significant headway. Within two days
we can reach the [Suez] canal area.” At the end of the meeting, the Israeli
cabinet reached an almost unanimous decision to launch the preemptive
strike the next morning.56
A4: The Victim’s Ignorance
In complete contrast with Israel, the Arab nations in 1967 lacked even the
most basic intelligence on the capabilities and disposition of their oppon-
ent. According to Kenneth M. Pollack, “Egypt had no idea what the Israeli
attack would look like, what its objectives would be … the Egyptian mili-
tary intelligence just did not know how the Israeli military fought: they
didn’t know what its tactics were, and they didn’t understand its emphasis
on speed and constant forward movement, its decentralized command
structure … its reliance on armor supported by air power, or its commit-
ment to preemptive strikes.”57 Having no idea of the extent of the Israeli
intelligence penetration of their own ranks, the Arab armies were similarly
unable to take even the most elementary precautions that would have
diminished Israel’s information and first strike advantage.
Consequently, Arab leaders dramatically underestimated Israeli’s bargain-
ing range, believing they could push the envelope of military threats against
Israel with impunity. Thinking that Israel’s military strategy and capabilities
would match those of the 1956 Suez crisis, Nasser was confident that his
army deployed to the Sinai could withstand an IDF attack. The lack of an
Israeli response as the crisis escalated seems to have reinforced this assur-
ance. This Israeli inaction as soon as the crisis began, as Mossad Chief
Meir Amit acknowledged, led the Egyptians to grow increasingly bolder,
and take further provocative action, even though they also wanted to avoid
an all-out war the whole time.58
The Egyptian ignorance, combined with the Israeli failure to take action
to deter further provocations, was the major reason for the spiraling of the
crisis. This was particularly apparent in the final phase before the Israeli
decision to launch a preemptive strike. Even though Nasser accurately pre-
dicted that Israel might attack in the first days of June,59 he completely
failed to assess its scope and the extent of devastation it would inflict upon
the Arab armies. Instead of seeking to de-escalate the crisis in face of the
looming danger of an Israeli strike, the Egyptians made further aggressive
56Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 333, 336; Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 188.
57Pollack, Arabs at War, 62.
58Segev, 1967: Israel, the War, 229, 259.
59Ibid., 229, 259.
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moves, giving the IDF the final arguments to propel the Israeli cabinet
to war.
Alternative Explanations
Conventional wisdom has generally credited Israel’s lack of geographic
depth vis-a-vis its Arab foes, as well as its commensurately offensive mili-
tary doctrine, for the decision to launch the preemptive strike in 1967.
According to this view, Israel lacked both manpower and strategic depth in
its territory to effectively implement the more deliberate strategy of defen-
sive, attritional warfare against its far more populous neighbors.
Furthermore, Israel’s overwhelming reliance on reserve forces, which could
not be kept mobilized over prolonged periods, had placed severe limits on
the time Israel could afford to spend engaged in a highly mobilized state.
According to conventional wisdom, these factors, combined with the confi-
dence in IDF’s offensive capabilities, earned during the Suez War in 1956,
compelled Israel to strike first in 1967.60
Closer scrutiny reveals two major problems with this view. First, it does
not explain why Israel did not employ deterrent strategies, discussed earlier
in this paper, which could have prevented the Arab nations from challeng-
ing Israel’s precarious position in the first place. For instance, the idea to
stage a nuclear test as a show of strength (at least two atomic bombs were
believed to have been available to Israel on the eve of the 1967 war) would
also have been perfectly in line with IDF’s offensive deterrence posture.61
And as Peres hinted in his memoirs,62 such a move would have likely
deterred the Arab nations and prevented the escalation.
Second, and more importantly, Israel’s geography and military doctrine
explain why Israel would have liked to carry out a preemptive strike in the
1967 circumstances, but not why it was able to do so. To conclude that the
preemptive strike option is more advantageous or less risky than other
strategies, the Israeli leadership needed additional insights. Without detailed
knowledge of their opponents, the Israelis had no way of knowing whether
they were about to launch an ineffectual or failed surprise attack that could
have backfired, creating an even more dangerous situation for Israel. As
confirmed by the historical record of surprise attacks,63 if the initial blow
was not decisive, Israel’s aggression would not only have provided the casus
belli but also the shock from the sneak attack would have most likely
60O’Ballance, The Third Arab-Israeli War, 40–41; Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War:
Government, Armed Forces and Defense Policy 1963–1967 (London, UK: Routledge, 2007), 24–25.
61Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 174–75.
62Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), 167.
63William M. Cochrane, Warning and Surprise: Tradeoffs for the Planner (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1992).
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rallied the collective Arab military might to descend on the Jewish state.
Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz provided a shrewd summary of
this conundrum:
A bold move aimed with surgical precision at the enemy’s weak points can bring
victory at little cost, but it can also fail disastrously if the points of attack turn out to
be much stronger than expected … The fact that the Israelis were consistently
relational is an indication of their unusual reliance on intelligence. Only the gambler
with inside information can rationally bet his whole stake on a single race.64
Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis
The well-known events of the Cuban missile crisis were prompted by the
US intelligence discovery of the Soviet installation of medium and inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles on the island on 15 October 1962. The
USSR had clandestinely transferred the missiles to Cuba since the early
summer of 1962, hoping to keep their existence secret until they could pre-
sent the United States with a fait accompli when the missiles became oper-
ational. The Soviet nuclear gamble was intended to redress the gross
imbalance in strategic nuclear weapons in favor of the United States.65
During the late 1950s, the increasingly extensive reconnaissance of the
Soviet territory exposed the USSR nuclear disadvantage, which the United
States mercilessly exploited in their diplomatic dealings. This prompted
Soviet fears that the United States might respond to this weakness with a
preemptive strike or use its nuclear preeminence to compel constant Soviet
concessions in international disputes.66 The second rationale for the Soviet
missile deployment was to deter what the Kremlin believed to be an immi-
nent US invasion of Cuba. From Moscow’s perspective, deterring the
American encroachment of an ally so exposed as Cuba would be a clear
demonstration of the Soviet’s ability to hold its ground and balance US
power globally.67 Thus, in the summer of 1962, Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev initiated his ultrasecret plan to deploy nuclear missiles
in Cuba.
What Khrushchev failed to appreciate, however, was the strategic and
political significance that the United States attached to Cuba. Harkening
back to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States deemed hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere essential for its security, and Cuba was a centerpiece
64Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 219–20.
65At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had three thousand ready-to-launch strategic nuclear
weapons, compared to just 250 on the Soviet side. See Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban
Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992), 2.
66Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London, UK:
Penguin Books, 1999), 235–36.
67Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revised to Include New Revelations from Soviet &
Cuban Sources (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 8, 15.
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of this strategy. At the time of the greatest external challenge in US history,
the threat of a Soviet nuclear deployment in Cuba had an additional sali-
ency for strategic thinking in Washington. For the Kennedy administration,
in particular, whose credibility in dealing with the Soviet threat was badly
damaged by the Bay of Pigs fiasco and a series of diplomatic setbacks, a
successful Soviet challenge in Cuban represented a “mortal danger.” On the
whole, US political sensitivities surrounding the issue of Cuba guaranteed a
major confrontation once the Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba was discov-
ered.68 From the 16 October 1962 initial meeting of the special Executive
Committee (ExComm) that President John F. Kennedy established to deal
with the crisis, there could be no doubt that the only acceptable outcome
for the United States would involve the complete removal of Soviet nuclear
weapons from Cuba. The only question was which strategy the United
States would employ to impose this outcome.69
The most significant aspect of the Cuban missile crisis from the view-
point of this paper’s theory is the US decision making vis-a-vis the option
to eliminate the Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba through a surprise airstrike.
The analysis that follows will assess the impact of intelligence on the feasi-
bility of this option and trace how this affected the course of the crisis.
B1 and B2: Intelligence and the US Administration’s Options
General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962,
later summarized that the United States had three options for dealing with
the Soviet missiles in Cuba: “‘Take them out’ through a military strike,
‘squeeze them out’ through coercive pressure, or ‘buy them out’ through a
negotiated settlement.”70 During the first meeting of the ExComm on 16
October, the military strike alternative appeared to prevail decisively.
Although the full range of options was explored in detail, the meeting con-
veyed a general sense that diplomatic and coercive strategies would be
insufficient to compel a Soviet withdrawal and that a “surgical” airstrike to
take out the missiles was the only remedy. At the end of the discussion,
President Kennedy unequivocally concluded that a surprise air strike of this
sort would have to be carried out. His only dilemma was whether further
military action would be required after the strikes and the risks associated
with this escalation.71 Despite the urge to implement a strong response to
the Soviet challenge, the Kennedy administration was also determined to
68Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York:
Longman, 1999), 194–95.
69“Transcript of the first Executive Committee Meeting, October 16, 1962 11:50 A.M.—12:57 P.M.,” in Chang and
Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.
70Ibid.
71“Recording of the Executive Committee Meeting, 11:50 A.M.–12:57 P.M., October 16, 1962,” JFK Presidential
Library, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc2.html.
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avoid paths of forcible action that “raised the prospect of that it [the crisis]
might escalate … into a nuclear war.”72
Thus, right from the first ExComm meeting, the support for the air-
strikes option came with significant strings attached. First, there was the
assumption that the airstrike option would be “surgical”—that it could
quickly neutralize the threat without the need for a large follow-up military
action that could escalate the crisis.73 The second assumption was that an
airstrike should only be considered if it could be carried out before the
missiles become operational. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, in par-
ticular, insisted that “any airstrike should be planned to take place prior
the time they [the missiles] become operational. Because, if they become
operational before the airstrike, I do not believe … we can knock them
out before they are launched.”74
Close scrutiny of ExComm meeting transcripts reveals that the main
problem for the US military in offering these assurances was their inability
to pinpoint the location of the Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. From the
very first crisis meeting, General Taylor maintained the opinion that the
airstrikes would “never be 100 percent” effective in taking out the missiles.
Taylor’s hesitation stemmed from the lack of precise intelligence on the
Soviet nuclear deployment. As was abundantly clear from his presentation,
the armed services lacked sufficient reconnaissance information on the
locations and layouts of the missile sites and the timing when they would
become operational. The best the Air Force could hope for under these cir-
cumstances, according to Taylor, was “to take out the vast majority in the
first strike.” But the assurance that the entire complement of Soviet missiles
would be eliminated amid uncertainty about their number and whereabouts
required a continuous air offensive, authorized to strike new targets as they
were discovered.75
The tendency of the US military to balance their lack of intelligence for
a “surgical” strike by escalating the scope of the operation becomes even
more apparent in the second meeting of the ExComm, in the afternoon of
16 October. After their internal consultations between the two meetings,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now strongly opposed to a limited air attack.
At that juncture, according to Secretary McNamara, the scale of the attack
could not be limited to below “several hundred” airstrike sorties due to the
“lack [of] certain intelligence.”76 Even for their greatly expanded target
package, the Joint Chiefs recommended to “get complete intelligence …
72Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 200.
73Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 59.
74“Recording of the Executive Committee Meeting, 11:50 A.M.–12:57 P.M., October 16, 1962.”
75Ibid.
76“Transcript of the Executive Committee Meeting, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M., October 16, 1962,” JFK Presidential
Library, https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/doc3.html.
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[over] the next two or three days,” before an effective airstrike could be
planned. The extent of this shortcoming compelled the military to back off
even further as the discussion progressed. When President Kennedy, who
was still in favor of the airstrikes option, proposed to tentatively schedule
them for 20 or 21 October, General Taylor urged him not to set any dead-
lines until the required intelligence could be gathered.77
By this time, doubts about the success of a limited surprise attack had
begun to sway the debate toward the less confrontational option of a naval
blockade. As the pressure for action intensified in the next few days, the US
military and intelligence services failed to provide the assurances needed to
put the military option back on the table. By 21 October, just a day before
Kennedy’s televised address to the nation, US intelligence located only thirty
out of the estimated forty-eight missiles on the island. General Walter C.
Sweeney, commander of the Tactical Air Command, which was to carry out
the strikes in Cuba, briefed the ExComm that even “under the optimum
conditions,” it was likely that the known missiles would not be all destroyed.
“The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles,”
General Taylor concluded. To finish the job, the military leadership “strongly
emphasized that … the initial air strike must be followed by strikes on sub-
sequent days and that these, in turn, would lead inevitably to an invasion.”78
By this time, President Kennedy “had already moved from the air-strike
to the blockade camp.”79 According to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
General Sweeney’s presentation “ended the small, lingering doubt that
might still have remained in his mind. It had worried him that a blockade
would not remove the missiles—now it was clear that an attack would not
accomplish that task completely, either.”80 The vast majority of the
ExComm members shared the president’s sentiment. According to Central
Intelligence Agency Director John McCone, “More extreme steps such as
limited air strike, comprehensive air strike, or military invasion” had not
been ruled out, but for the time being a majority considered them
“unwise.”81 On the evening of the following day, 22 October, President
Kennedy announced the US naval blockade of Cuba.
B3 and B4: Graduated Response, Effective Signaling, and Deterrence
This paper’s theory suggests that a first-strike option enabled by extensive
intelligence penetration would suppress strategies of graduated escalation and
77Ibid.
78Robert S. McNamara, “Notes on October 21, 1961 Meeting with the President,” https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/
cuba_mis_cri/19621021mcnam.pdf
79Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 205.
80Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 49.
81Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from
Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 291.
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deterrent signaling for fear of alerting the intended victim. This was clearly
true for the first phase of the Cuban missile crisis when surprise airstrikes
were still the dominant option considered by the Kennedy administration. In
the afternoon meeting of ExComm on 16 October, the first day of the crisis,
the discussion about a possible diplomatic warning to the Soviet leadership
quickly collided with the imperative of keeping the US intelligence discovery
of the Soviet missiles secret, so that the surprise air attack option could remain
feasible. President Kennedy gave this reaction to the diplomatic warning pro-
posals: “I completely agree that there isn’t any doubt that if we announced
that there were MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile] sites going up …
this really would put the burden on the Soviets. On the other hand, the very
fact of doing that … We lose all the advantages of our strike.”82
But as the surprise attack option was gradually abandoned due to the lack
of intelligence, the ExComm began to introduce an elaborate scheme of
deterrent signaling to put a more graduated pressure on the Soviets. When
the ExComm finally endorsed the naval blockade strategy, the major
emphasis turned toward communicating US resolve through diplomatic
measures and military posturing. President Kennedy’s globally broadcasted
address on 22 October, in particular, had served to remove any potential
ambiguity about the US determination to prevent the nuclearization of Cuba,
as well as to its response to possible Soviet countermoves. The address, and
the subsequent communications of the Kennedy administration, had a
decisive influence on the peaceful outcome of the crisis, as it focused the
attention of the Soviet leadership on possible diplomatic solutions.83
More dramatic, however, was the change in the attitude of the US mili-
tary once the need to protect the secrecy of the surprise attack was
removed. On 22 October, at the very hour of President Kennedy’s address,
US Strategic Air Command (SAC) transmitted the orders to increase the
worldwide alert status of US nuclear forces to defense condition
(DEFCON) 3 “in the clear,” using an unencrypted broadcast. On 24
October, SAC again broadcasted unencrypted orders for its forces to go to
DEFCON 2—only one step away from war. This move was taken “so that
the Soviets would not mistake the seriousness of the US military prepara-
tions to wage nuclear war.”84 According to Raymond L. Garthoff, “Caught
unaware, the Soviet leaders’ first inclination was to reassess the situation
… avoiding any provocative reaction that might trigger further American
reactions.”85 This deterrent signaling by the United States, coupled with
(faulty) Soviet intelligence of an imminent US invasion, convinced
82“Transcript of the Executive Committee Meeting, 6:30 P.M.–7:55 P.M., October 16, 1962.”
83Raymond L. Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in Intelligence and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. James G. Blight and David A. Welch (London, UK: Frank Cass, 1998), 58–59.
84Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 79.
85Garthoff, “U.S. Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 62.
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Khrushchev to offer a hasty plan for a diplomatic settlement in his emo-
tional letter of 26 October, and to accept President Kennedy’s counteroffer
on 27 October.86
Alternative Explanations
According to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s account of the Cuban
missile crisis, “The choice of the blockade instead of an airstrike turned on
two points: (1) the moral argument that the United States could not per-
petuate a ‘Pearl Harbor’ in reverse; (2) the belief that a ‘surgical’ air strike
was impossible.”87 They argue that the latter was due to the organizational
inability of the US military to devise a limited airstrikes plan, customized
to deliver a “surgical” attack against the Soviet missile installations. They
suggest the time pressure to come up with a plan did not allow the military
to make this detailed adjustment, as this contingency was not part of their
bureaucratic repertoire.
While accepting the general validity of the bureaucratic politics para-
digm, this paper’s analysis proposes a different, more precise causal path-
way from the one offered in Allison and Zelikow’s account. It argues that
the US military could not devise a plan that satisfied the requirement for
“surgical” strikes largely due to the inability to pinpoint and track the loca-
tion of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. As the US Air Force lacked the intelli-
gence to provide assurance that the attacking jets would find their targets,
bureaucratic politics kicked in: the military turned to their plans for mas-
sive airstrikes in an attempt to accomplish their objective through sim-
ple overkill.
Allison and Zelikow’s second argument about the technical infeasibility
of the airstrike option hinges on the idea that the precision of the US Air
Force weapons at the time was insufficient for a “surgical” strike. However,
even though this factor certainly contributed to the demise of the airstrike
option, it was not decisive. As we have seen in the preceding case study,
Israel—armed with virtually the same technology—was able to pull off an
immensely successful “surgical” air strike that completely eliminated the
Egyptian air force.
The main difference between the US capabilities in 1962 and Israel’s in
1967 was the availability of comprehensive intelligence. On one hand, the
order of battle of Arab air forces was known in minute detail, and the
Israeli planes had no problem in planning a surprise attack and then strik-
ing their targets with devastating precision. The US Air Force, on the other
hand, confronted the duty of eliminating a target set that was only partially
86Ibid., 33.
87Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 124.
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located. Even decades later, intelligence maintained its causal primacy over
precision weaponry when it comes to air power effectiveness. Analyses of
the 1999 Kosovo war, for instance, were unequivocal that the lack of
adequate targeting intelligence was the key reason why the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization’s air forces destroyed a mere 2% of the Serb army,
despite their unprecedented use of precision munitions.88
Allison and Zelikow’s other thesis, that the Kennedy administration
rejected the surprise attack option on moral grounds because the United
States would be committing a “Pearl Harbor in reverse” against a small
nation, was indeed a key argument of the opponents of the military option
throughout the debates. However, the timing of when these ethical consid-
erations entered the ExComm debates strongly suggests they were of sec-
ondary importance. The Kennedy administration displayed little moral
restraint in regard to intervening in Cuba both before and during the mis-
sile crisis.89 The “Pearl Harbor in reverse” argument gained traction only
after the surprise-air-strikes option that would eliminate the missile threat
was effectively discredited as unfeasible.90 This historical analogy was first
made by Undersecretary of State George Ball at the end of the second
meeting on 16 October, but in the context of the Soviet responses it might
elicit, not the of potential damage to the US moral standing.91 A coherent
moral argument was only articulated a few days later—it provided the
Kennedy administration the ability to claim the moral high ground, allow-
ing it to eliminate the by then clearly infeasible air strikes alternative in
favor of a blockade without appearing weak at home and abroad.92 Against
this backdrop, the “Pearl Harbor in reverse” argument was at least as much
a justification for the administration’s choices, designed to shore up polit-
ical and diplomatic support for the naval blockade of Cuba, as it was a rea-
son for why this option was selected over the airstrike alternative.
Conclusion: Intelligence as a Destabilizing Factor in
International Relations
This article proposes a new conceptual framework for analyzing the effects
of intelligence on interstate crisis bargaining, focused on its ability to cata-
lyze offensive action. I argue that states that have secured extensive intelli-
gence on their rivals are more liable to opt for a strategy of a surprise
attack in international disputes. These claims find strong support against
88Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corp., 2001), 55, 61.
89Dominic Tierney, “‘Pearl Harbor in Reverse’: Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War
Studies 9, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 55, 61.
90Ibid., 55, 61, 66–68, 74.
91Chang and Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 112.
92Tierney, “Pearl Harbor in Reverse,” 72.
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the record of two archetypal interstate crises: the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
and the 1967 Arab-Israeli confrontation. These cases provide unique ana-
lytic leverage to verify the offensive bias produced by extensive intelligence
penetration, as they offer unparalleled insight into crisis decision making
and cover the meaningful variation in the key variables of interest (the
scope of intelligence penetration and the choices to launch surprise
attacks). Although a definitive validation of this theory requires further
testing with additional cases, spanning a wider range of cases, background
contexts, and different types of conflict, the paired comparison of these
paradigmatic crises offers strong initial support and key insights.
Crucially, the lessons of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the 1967
Arab-Israeli War may be even more relevant today. Over the past fifty
years, the ability of advanced militaries to gather strategic intelligence and
rapidly translate it into devastating offensive action has grown by many
orders of magnitude. In particular, the immense leaps in information-gath-
ering capabilities, stealth, precision-guided weaponry, and other technolo-
gies have vastly expanded the potential for using intelligence scoops to
target critical forces, infrastructure, and second-strike deterrent capabilities,
as well as to perform decapitation strikes against the opponents’ leadership.
New technologies that have begun to enter the arsenals of advanced milita-
ries, such as hypersonic missiles, low-yield nuclear weapons, autonomous
drones, and new stealth platforms will greatly augment this role of intelli-
gence as a critical enabler of surprise attacks. Similarly, the advent of cyber-
warfare—which blurs the lines between information collection and
offensive and defensive action even further93—is bound to further exacer-
bate the surprise attack threat posed by intelligence penetration, and
increase the pressures to strike before the fleeting advantage is lost.
From this perspective, the findings of this paper have two major policy-
relevant implications. First, as paralyzing first strikes that take advantage of
intelligence penetration might be carried out on very short notice and with-
out extensive preparations, the value of defensive warning intelligence,
traditionally considered the main safeguard against strategic surprise, seems
poised to decline. Counterintelligence and information protection—activ-
ities that have received even less attention than intelligence in the literature
on international relations—will likely play a more important role in this
context. Measures to build redundancies and the resiliencies in the armed
forces and critical infrastructure should as well. Second, policymakers
should recognize and anticipate the enormous destabilizing potential of
new precision-strike capabilities they are investing in, particularly as their
effects are bound to be multiplied by extensive intelligence penetration. To
avoid highly volatile international crises and unwanted escalations, leading
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world powers might be well advised to include limitations and bans on the
development and deployment of such capabilities in future arms treaties.
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